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Descripción
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| The main objectives of this research are the following: To compare traffic estimations and real traffic in tool road concessions vs. free roads in the longterm in Spain and other countries of the world with a long exoeirence in the implementation of toll road concessions (such as the United Kingdom, Chile and México). ? To define a microeconomic model base don the Principal Agent Theory that provides the strategic interaction among the stakeholders involved in a concession contract (the government, the bidders, the concessionaire, the lenders and the users). ? To determine whether the consistent bias towards overestimating traffic by the bidders in toll road concessions is caused by strategic reasons. ? To identifity the causes that may prompt the bidders to commit strategic errors. Particulary, we will analyze incompleteness of the concession contracts, the level of competition in the tender, the willingness of the government to renegotiate, and the implementation of mechanisms to mitígate traffic risk. ? To review the experience around the world regarding the implementation of traffic risk mitigation mechanisms in road concessions, and carry out a definition and a characterization of them. ? To define other possible mitigation mechanisms coming from tow different approaches: using Theory of Incentives (Prinicpal-Agent models), when traffic error comes from demand forecast?s error. ? To build up an integrated model that calculates the social welfare for each stakeholder and for all the society stemming from the implementation of traffic risk mitigation mechanisms in road concessions submitedd to traffic uncertainty, which can be concived as a vaild way of evaluation mechanisms? efficiency. | |
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Internacional
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No |
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Tipo de proyecto
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Proyectos y convenios en convocatorias públicas competitivas |
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Entidad financiadora
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Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación |
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Nacionalidad Entidad
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ESPAÑA |
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Tamaño de la entidad
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Desconocido |
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Fecha concesión
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01/01/2010 |