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Descripción
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| This paper develops a model based on agency theory to analyze road management systems (under the different contract forms available today) that employ a mechanism of performance indicators to establish the payment of the agent. The base assumption is that of asymmetric information between the principal (Public Authorities) and the agent (contractor) and the risk aversion of this latter. It is assumed that the principal may only measure the agent?s performance indirectly and by means of certain performance indicators that may be verified by the authorities. In this model there is presumed to be a relation between the efforts made by the agent and the performance level measured by the corresponding indicators, though it is also considered that there may be dispersion between both variables that gives rise to a certain degree of randomness in the contract. An analysis of the optimal contract has been made on the basis of this model and in accordance with a series of parameters that characterize the economic environment and the particular conditions of road infrastructure. As a result of the analysis made, it is considered that an optimal contract should generally combine a fixed component and a payment in accordance with the performance level obtained. The higher the risk aversion of the agent and the greater the marginal cost of public funds, the lower the impact of this performance-based payment. By way of conclusion, the system of performance indicators should be as broad as possible but should not overweight those indicators that encompass greater randomness in their results. | |
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Internacional
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Si |
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Nombre congreso
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13th World Conference on Transport Research |
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Tipo de participación
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960 |
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Lugar del congreso
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Revisores
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Si |
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ISBN o ISSN
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DOI
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Fecha inicio congreso
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15/07/2013 |
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Fecha fin congreso
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18/07/2013 |
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