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Descripción
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| The unpreventable connections between real networked systems have recently called for an examination of percolation, diffusion or synchronization phenomena in multilayer networks. Here we use network science and game theory to explore interactions in networks-of-networks and model these as a game for gaining importance. We propose a viewpoint where networks choose the connection strategies, in contrast with classical approaches where nodes are the active players. Specifically, we investigate how creating paths between networks leads to different Nash equilibria that determine their structural and dynamical properties. In a wide variety of cases, selecting adequate connections leads to a cooperative solution that allows weak networks to overcome the strongest opponent. Counterintuitively, each weak network can induce a global transition to such cooperative configuration regardless of the actions of the strongest network. This power of the weak reveals a critical dominance of the underdogs in the fate of networks-of-networks. | |
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Internacional
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Si |
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JCR del ISI
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Si |
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Título de la revista
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Nature Communications |
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ISSN
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2041-1723 |
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Factor de impacto JCR
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11,329 |
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Información de impacto
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Volumen
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7 |
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DOI
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Número de revista
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Desde la página
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13273-1 |
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Hasta la página
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13273- |
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Mes
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SIN MES |
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Ranking
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