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Descripción
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| To design the optimal policy subsidies, a model Stackelberg equilibrium is established, allowing penetration of hydrogen as an alternative fuel. The State plays the role of leader and owners of filling stations that can potentially accommodate hydrogen as an alternative fuel, are the followers. The leader wants to design the subsidy policy that minimizes the investment required for the effective deployment of the infrastructure and owners of potential refueling stations, which may include hydrogen as fuel, dynamically decide to implement or not (variables lower level) the alternative fuel hydrogen, based on estimates ofreturn on their investment based on current subsidy policies and the demand for alternative fuels. The model reflects the behaviour of the different actors in the process (State, station owners refuelling and owners of electric vehicles fuel cell) in a dynamic context and competition between refuellingstations. The aspect of competition is new in the literature, since in most works a coordinated location is assumed, that is, a monopoly on the ownership of refuelling stations for alternative fuels or, equivalently, the existence of a state you can force any individual owner to install a alternative fuel refuelling station, the aim being to maximize the benefit of the company or sole proprietor maximize overall network coverage. | |
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Internacional
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Si |
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Entidad
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10th World Congress of Chemical Engineering (WCCE10) |
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Lugar
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Barcelona |
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Páginas
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Referencia/URL
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Tipo de publicación
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Congress Proceedings |