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Descripción
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| Many governments are increasing private participation in providing and financing transportation infrastructure through concession contracts. One of the main challenges in the definition of those contracts is the correct allocation of risks between the public and the private sectors. Traffic risk has usually been difficult to allocate because neither the concessionaire nor the government can reasonably control it. In addition, traffic forecasts have proved to be inaccurate. Consequently, many governments are implementing traffic risk mitigation mechanisms in concession contracts. One of these mechanisms is based on the establishment by the government of a minimum income guarantee. Results of the implementation of a minimum income guarantee in Chile are presented: 38 transportation concessions were awarded in the past 12 years. The economic crisis that struck Chile from 1998 to 2002, reducing traffic levels below forecasts, makes the analysis of the performance of that mechanism particularly interesting. Despite the economic crisis, the implementation of a minimum income guarantee in Chile worked well because it encouraged private participation and was not very costly for the government. However, that mechanism did not reduce renegotiation pressures from concessions¿ shareholders as a consequence of the crisis. | |
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Internacional
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No |
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JCR del ISI
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No |
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Título de la revista
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Transportation Research Record, vol. 1960 |
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ISSN
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0361-1981 |
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Factor de impacto JCR
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0 |
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Información de impacto
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Volumen
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1960 |
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DOI
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Número de revista
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1960 |
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Desde la página
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15 |
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Hasta la página
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23 |
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Mes
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SIN MES |
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Ranking
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