Descripción
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Overlay networks have been widely deployed upon the Internet to provide improved network services. However, the interaction between overlay and traffic engineering (TE) as well as among co-existing overlays may occur. In this paper, we adopt game theoretic approaches to analyze this hybrid interaction. Firstly, we model a situation of the hybrid interaction as an n+1- player non-cooperative game, where overlays and TE are of equal status, and prove the existence of Nash equilibrium (NE). Secondly, we model another situation of the hybrid interaction as a 1-leadern-follower Stackelberg-Nash game, where TE is the leader and coexisting overlays are followers, and prove that the cost at Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium (SNE) is at least as good as that at NE for TE. Thirdly, we propose a cooperative coalition mechanism based on Shapley value to overcome the inherent inefficiency of NE and SNE, where players can improve their performance and form stable coalitions. | |
Internacional
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Si |
Nombre congreso
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Local Computer Networks (LCN), 2015 IEEE 40th Conference on |
Tipo de participación
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960 |
Lugar del congreso
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Sheraton Sand Key Resort. 1160 Gulf Blvd. Clearwater Beach, FL, USA |
Revisores
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Si |
ISBN o ISSN
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978-1-4673-6770-7 |
DOI
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Fecha inicio congreso
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26/10/2015 |
Fecha fin congreso
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23/10/2015 |
Desde la página
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365 |
Hasta la página
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372 |
Título de las actas
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Local Computer Networks (LCN), 2015 IEEE 40th Conference on |