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Descripción
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| This paper seeks to characterize the factors that explain crop insurance participation. A stylized model of insurance demand with a simple setup of one crop, CARA preferences yield insurance and pdfs revenue and yield with moment generating functions, provides a number of hypothesis about the incentives to contract crop insurance.In the empirical model we use the actual insurance record of 41.660 Spanish farmers and 12 years of data to estimate six probit models for the insuring versus non-insuring choice based on individual loss rations and the dispertions of indemnities together with idiosyncratic and geographical variables. Results sugest that advers selection is not a major source of inefficiency in the Spanish insurance system, nor is it the primary motivation to contract crop insurance.Conclusions are aplicable to very divers farms in Spain. | |
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Internacional
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Si |
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Nombre congreso
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101st Seminar of EAAE, Managing of Climate Risks in Agriculture |
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Tipo de participación
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960 |
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Lugar del congreso
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Berlin, Alemania |
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Revisores
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Si |
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ISBN o ISSN
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DOI
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Fecha inicio congreso
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05/07/2007 |
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Fecha fin congreso
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06/07/2007 |
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