Abstract
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A sustainable agricultural insurance system provides benefits to both insurers and insured agents. Equilibrium in the loss ratio and risk pooling are fundamental to guarantee such sustainability. Achieving equilibrium in the loss ratio requires accurate risk estimation. An agricultural insurance risk pool is a concurrence of producers whose different production risks in time and space are combined. Pooling risks together allows the losses of the producers registering claims in a certain year and a certain area to be offset by total premiums paid by producers participating in the system either registering claims or not. Agricultural insurance faces a number of market imperfections that end up in market failures, compromising loss ratio equilibrium and risk pooling. Common imperfections are information failure, asymmetric information and low insurance demand. This Thesis evaluates different aspects that hinder risk setting and that constitute disincentives to crop insurance demand in order to contribute with new insights that could make insurance systems more sustainable. First, we address a central issue in agricultural risk assessment, the availability of data. For that, we adapted methodologies, some of them commonly implemented in other scientific and technical spheres, to be applied in crop insurance. In particular, we evaluate the opportunities for using index insurances, crop models and yield gap analysis. | |
International
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No |
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Type
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Doctoral |
Mark Rating
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Sobresaliente cum laude |
Date
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