Memorias de investigación
Artículos en revistas:
Optimizing the payment mechanism in transportation public-private partnerships
Año:2019
Áreas de investigación
  • Ingenierías,
  • Humanidades y ciencias sociales
Datos
Descripción
This paper discusses a model based on the agency theory to analyse the optimal payment mechanism in transportation Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), within an environment with asymmetric information between the public authority and the agent (contractor). It is assumed that there are two random components in the contract: the first one is the presence of unpredictable factors that affect service demand, and the second one is the possible disparity between the effort made by the agent and the effective results obtained with respect to service quality. The main outcome of the paper is that an optimal contract should generally combine a fixed component, a performance-based payment for service quality and a payment in accordance with the number of users. It is only possible to totally exclude the transfer of the demand risk in those cases where the public authority can define and verify a series of indicators that cover all the quality dimensions of the service, this being a situation difficult to obtain in practice in the majority of transportation projects.
Internacional
No
JCR del ISI
Si
Título de la revista
Public Money & Management
ISSN
0954-0962
Factor de impacto JCR
Información de impacto
Volumen
DOI
Número de revista
Desde la página
1
Hasta la página
1
Mes
SIN MES
Ranking
Esta actividad pertenece a memorias de investigación
Participantes
Grupos de investigación, Departamentos, Centros e Institutos de I+D+i relacionados
  • Creador: Grupo de Investigación: Planificación del Transporte