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Descripción
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| The outsourcing of public services has acquired a prominent position in the political agenda of many countries in recent decades. This paper contributes an analysis of the outsourcing of a public service under a theoretical framework based on a multitask principal-agent model. For the management of the service, a contract is assumed that includes certain incentives to the contractor linked to the outcomes in two types of activities: the first related to cost saving, and the second related to the improvement of the quality of the service. The main results of the paper show, in the first place, the conditions under which the outsourcing of a public service is economically unfeasible. Additionally, the paper shows that, under perfect information conditions, the optimal incentives include the contractor retaining all the cost savings. On the contrary, under conditions of asymmetric information on the quality of the service, the contract should stipulate a certain distribution of the cost savings between the public authority and the contractor. More in general, the formalization of the model presented in this work can contribute to a better understanding of the role of the contracts, and therefore to their improvement. | |
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Internacional
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Si |
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JCR del ISI
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Si |
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Título de la revista
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Sustainability |
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ISSN
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2071-1050 |
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Factor de impacto JCR
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2,592 |
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Información de impacto
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Volumen
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11 |
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DOI
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10.3390/su11247231 |
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Número de revista
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24 |
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0 |
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Hasta la página
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12 |
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SIN MES |
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Ranking
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