Observatorio de I+D+i UPM

Descripción
A relative large proportion of the academic literature about the agency dilemma studies corporate governance or the instruments that can balance the incentives of shareholders and debt holders. This article studies a balance sheet instrument, the mandatory convertible bond, as a means to increase the value for shareholders, without reducing the bondholders claim. Following the options valuations theories, one way to increase the value for shareholders is to increase the risk of the firm that in turn reduces the value for bondholders. The results show that after the issuance of mandatory convertible bonds, companies reduce the return required by bondholders and at the same time increase its equity volatility and the potential shareholder value.
Internacional	Si
Nombre congreso	13th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Industrial Management XXIII Congreso de Ingeniería de Organización
Tipo de participación	960
Lugar del congreso	GIJON, SPAIN
Revisores	Si
ISBN o ISSN	CDP08UPM
DOI
Fecha inicio congreso	11/06/2019
Fecha fin congreso	12/06/2019
Desde la página	1
Hasta la página	8
Título de las actas	CIO 2019 PROCEEDINGS

Esta actividad pertenece a memorias de investigación

• Autor: Carlos Rodriguez Monroy (UPM)

• Creador: Grupo de Investigación: Ingeniería de la Calidad Alimentaria
• Departamento: Ingeniería de Organización, Administración de Empresas y Estadística