Memorias de investigación
Communications at congresses:
Mandatory Convertibles and Shareholders Incentives
Year:2019
Research Areas
  • Economy,
  • Company,
  • Finance,
  • Capital,
  • Financial policy,
  • Capital market,
  • Financing
Information
Abstract
A relative large proportion of the academic literature about the agency dilemma studies corporate governance or the instruments that can balance the incentives of shareholders and debt holders. This article studies a balance sheet instrument, the mandatory convertible bond, as a means to increase the value for shareholders, without reducing the bondholders claim. Following the options valuations theories, one way to increase the value for shareholders is to increase the risk of the firm that in turn reduces the value for bondholders. The results show that after the issuance of mandatory convertible bonds, companies reduce the return required by bondholders and at the same time increase its equity volatility and the potential shareholder value.
International
Si
Congress
13th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Industrial Management XXIII Congreso de Ingeniería de Organización
960
Place
GIJON, SPAIN
Reviewers
Si
ISBN/ISSN
CDP08UPM
Start Date
11/06/2019
End Date
12/06/2019
From page
1
To page
8
CIO 2019 PROCEEDINGS
Participants
Research Group, Departaments and Institutes related
  • Creador: Grupo de Investigación: Ingeniería de la Calidad Alimentaria
  • Departamento: Ingeniería de Organización, Administración de Empresas y Estadística